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Based on the theory of the Norm of Reciprocity (NOR), this study is focused on an 
individual’s data sharing behavior with respect to academic research by investigating 
their attitude towards data sharing and external funding. A measure was developed for 
data sharing, and the Adjusted Eisenberger Scale was attuned for measuring the Norm 
of Reciprocity. The measures were distributed by a random numbers generator to 
academic researchers at research intensive universities. The results show that NOR 
does not correlate with data sharing. There was also a negative correlation between 
scientists’ willingness to share data and external funding. The results are inconsistent 
with the psychological theory. 
 
Keywords:  Data Sharing, Norm of Reciprocity, Social Norms, Information Science, 













TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I  Introduction and General Information ......................................................... 1 
Big Science, Bigger Data ............................................................................................. 1 
Collaboration ............................................................................................................ 4 
The Norm of Reciprocity .......................................................................................... 5 
Data Sharing and Reciprocity: The Connection ........................................................... 6 
Research Questions ................................................................................................. 6 
Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................ 7 
Table 1. Terms and Definitions ................................................................................ 8 
CHAPTER II  Literature Review ...................................................................................... 9 
The Carrot and the Stick: Rules and Expectations for Data Sharing Practices ............ 9 
Repositories: Institutional and Subject ................................................................... 16 
The Theory of the Norm of Reciprocity .................................................................. 20 
Compliance Benefits and Detriments ..................................................................... 20 
Injunctive and Descriptive Norms ........................................................................... 22 
To Share or Not To Share ...................................................................................... 24 
Status, Power, Face ............................................................................................... 27 
Data Sharing and the Norm of Reciprocity Connection .......................................... 28 
Research Questions for Analysis ........................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER III Method .................................................................................................... 30 
Measures and Method ............................................................................................... 30 
Definition of the Population .................................................................................... 30 
Operationalization of the Research Questions ....................................................... 31 
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 34 
Instrumentation ...................................................................................................... 35 
Table 2: Variables, Research Questions & Items on the Survey ............................... 37 
CHAPTER IV  Results ................................................................................................... 39 
Results ....................................................................................................................... 39 
Post-Hoc Analysis .................................................................................................. 43 
CHAPTER V  Discussion and Limitations ..................................................................... 47 
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 58 





LIST OF TABLES 
 
              
 
 1. Terms and Definitions . .............................................................................. 8 
 2. Variables, Research Questions & Items on the Survey……………………37 
 3. Norm of Reciprocity Reliability Scale………………………………………...41 
 3. Data Sharing and Demographics Index Scale………………………………41 











LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 1. Participants by Research Area……………………………………………………….39 








CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Big Science, Bigger Data 
 
 In the early 1940s, the United States was at war.  After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii by the Japanese, the U.S. could no longer remain neutral in World War 
II.   Desperation required inspiration and research.  Research on new weaponry, like the 
atomic bomb, was seen as a necessity in order for the U.S. to win the war.   The 
necessity and perhaps desperation for scientific research and discovery, enabled 
collaborations from some of the best scientific minds of the time.  An effort as large as 
winning a world war required collaboration and money.  Within 6 years, weaponry was 
developed that would inevitably win the war (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962).  Along with 
that weaponry, “Big Science” was born (de Solla Price, 1986).     Science transitioned 
from smaller, institutional, research facilities, funded by individuals or corporations, to 
“Big Science” funded by government entities, such as the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) and National Institute of Health (NIH) (Galison & Hevly, 1992).  “Big Science” 
required sophisticated experiments, apparatus, collaboration, and money (de Solla 
Price, 1986).  The birth of “Big Science” coincides with technology and technological 
advances.  Experimental apparatus eventually became computer driven and the data 
deluge began (Oettinger, 1965; Bello, 1960; Hearings, 1956).  Data Deluge is defined 
as an overwhelming volume of information and the capacity to manage, use, and 
access that information (Hilbert 2011).  According to Hilbert and López, “the world’s 
technological information processing capacities are quickly growing at clearly 
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exponential rates” (2011).  According to longitudinal study conducted at the University of 
California, Berkeley in 2000 and then again in 2003, there was approximately 160 
Exabyte of stored information, with a projected compound annual growth rate of 57% 
per year (Lyman & Varian, 2003).   Granted, not all of this information is scientific data; 
however a large amount are research data.  How much scientific research data are out 
there somewhere and how does one access that data?   
According to Dr. Francine Berman, chairwoman of the Research Data Alliance, 
no one can be certain about the amount or the availability of data, but according to Alan 
Blateckly, the director of advanced cyberinfastructure at the National Science 
Foundation, “data is the new currency for research” (Markoff, 2013).   If data does 
indeed have value, in what way are data accessible to other researchers? How can one 
researcher obtain datasets from other researchers? “The casual approach for many 
scientists has been to ‘stick it on my disk drive and make it available to anyone who 
wants to use it,’” explains Dr. Vinton Cerf, vice president of Google (Markoff, 2013).  But 
what about scientists that do not make data “available to anyone who wants to use it’?  
With the sheer volume of data collected, why do some researchers and scientists 
remain hesitant about data sharing? 
 
Platform Access and Institutional Repositories 
    
 
According to Corbyn, researchers decline to share data for many reasons, 
including, the time it takes to make the data available, lack of reward system for sharing 
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data, lack of consequences for not sharing data, or “the rewards systems aren’t there 
and neither is the stick,” and the lack of a “standardized format to make accessing data 
more efficient and feasible,” (Corbyn 2011).  The problem of developing a standardized 
format for data archiving and retrieval still persists, in part because there is no new 
money for the new data deluge (Markoff, 2013).  “Publicly accessible data requires a 
stable home and someone to pay the mortgage,” explains Dr. Berman (Markoff, 2013).  
Although, there are several institutional repositories (IR) that collect data from 
researchers and scientists, the IRs pose problems across platforms because there is a 
lack of a data sharing software standard.  arXiv.org, CoRR, Repository 66, OpenDOAR, 
and Experimental OAI are a few IRs in operation and use.  These IRs do not support 
multiplatform IRs and because of the lack of standards, sharing data across platforms, 
universities, and research institutes can be difficult, if not impossible (ROAR, 2013). 
A first step in standardization of IRs is to start with an open access repository 
developed by a collaboration of librarians, scientists, potential public users, and 
university administration.  Open access repositories are defined as non-exclusive 
access and retrieval of data on a searchable interface.  In a study conducted at the 
University of Rochester an IR for archiving and accessing data sets was built in 2003.  
Six years after, the IR was unutilized (2009).  Building the IR at the University of 
Rochester in conjunction with the scientists, computer scientists, and librarians still 
yielded no data sharing (Nelson, 2009).  Although the University of Rochester’s IR was 
developed with the cooperation of scientists, researchers, and developers and training 
on the IR was available, the IR remains empty.  Perhaps providing a standardized 
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platform for archiving and retrieving data sets is not the only variable in a researcher’s 
decision to share or not share data?    
Collaboration 
 
Within the last decade, there have been several debates concerning data sharing 
and collaboration.  Within science policy circles, collaboration is seen as a progressive 
action and is often encouraged (Katz and Martin, 1997).   Collaborations between 
universities and industry have also been on the rise (Katz and Hicks, 1997).  Several 
studies have been conducted revealing the impact of collaboration, one specific study 
shows that collaborations with the biggest bibliometric impacts are authored by several 
people from multiple intuitions (Katz and Hicks, 1997) and from multidisciplinary fields 
(Kats and Hicks, 1995). “Growing collaboration is not only an expression of ‘big science’ 
but also a part of the globalization process in scientific research,” (Glanzel and 
Schubert, 2004).  However, no policy or procedure has been set into place to guide 
scientist on what collaboration involves.  Some of the questions asked about 
collaboration are: what exactly is collaboration; who does what; how much credit should 
a collaborator get; if a colleague shares data, is that colleague a collaborator (Katz and 
Martin, 1997)? 
Collaboration is a type of sharing (Katz and Martin, 1997).  A number of studies 
have been conducted involving sharing behavior, including one study exploring the 
Theory of Reasoned Action, which is used as a prediction of behavioral intention by way 
of attitudes and subjective norms (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).  In one study, the 
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researchers measured three factors of individual’s attitudes toward knowledge sharing, 
including extrinsic motivation, channel richness, and absorptive capacity.  They found 
that extrinsic motivation, which “refers to the performance of activities in order to attain 
some separable consequence” had no effect on sharing attitude. This led the 
researchers to conclude that “people basically do not care about what rewards they 
could attain by sharing their knowledge” (Kwok and Gao, 2006).  They found an effect 
with channel richness, which indicated that the more transmission channels (information 
input), the greater the chance that an individual would share knowledge.  The most 
profound construct in this study was that of absorptive capacity or learning process, 
which is defined as the “ability to not only acquire and assimilate but also to use 
knowledge” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  The researchers found that if there was a 
reciprocated knowledge exchange during the learning process, then both the recipient 
and the contributor are more likely to share information (Kwok and Gao, 2006). 
The Norm of Reciprocity 
 
The Norm of Reciprocity, which states that people will return benefits for benefits, 
is therefore a better indicator of people’s sharing behaviors.  As a norm, reciprocity is 
used for persuasion, cooperation and for self-sustaining relationships (Gouldner, 1960).  
The theory of the Norm of Reciprocity states that the norm is universal but conditional, 
whereas, it is practiced across cultures, yet once the benefit has gone unpaid, the cycle 
stops; tit for tat, is self-perpetuated, as a debt repaid is repaid with interest, and so the 
cycle continues as the balance is incessantly reversed.  
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Data Sharing and Reciprocity: The Connection 
  
This section presents the process in which this research topic was formulated. 
Several iterations and questions arise when pondering the theory of the Norm of 
Reciprocity and its impact on scientific data sharing. It is inferred from the research that 
the Norm of Reciprocity could be examined with regard to data sharing.  There are 
several assumptions with this assessment.  First, the research assumes that Gouldner’s 
theory is universal, meaning research scientists will prescribe to the norm and the 
normative theory. Secondly, it is also assumed that granting of a request, in this case, 
the receiving of data, will be seen as a benefit or favor. Thirdly, it is supposed that 
receiving public monies, i.e., a scientific grant, will also been viewed as a gift, or favor. 
Lastly, it is presumed that research scientist prescribe to the Baconion view of the 
scientific method, specifically, replication and independent verification of empirical 





 With theory, subject, and population in mind, the following research questions 
emerge: 
RQ1:  Are scientists who have a greater endorsement of the norm of reciprocity more 
likely to share data than scientists who have a lesser endorsement of the norm?   
RQ 2:  Are scientists that receive research support from a grant-funding source more 
likely to share data than those who do not receive support? 
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RQ 3:  Does the number of publications of scientists affect sharing behavior? 
RQ 4:  Would incentives or penalties from funding sources endorse sharing?   
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of this quantitative, descriptive, cross-sectional survey is to examine 
scientists’ behaviors and attitudes on data sharing and to test scientists’ endorsement of 
the norm of reciprocity with regards to data sharing and to examine other variables that 
may affect scientific data sharing such as: 1. Time spent as a researcher. 2. Number of 


















Table 1. Terms and Definitions 
Term  Definition 
Hard Sciences Math, Astronomy, Physics, Psychology and Chemistry.  
Defined as a science that uses quantitative data. 
Data The values of qualitative or quantitative variables belonging 
to a set of items collected together for reference or analysis 
Data Sharing The practice of making data used for scholarly research 
available to other investigators 
The Norm of 
Reciprocity 
The norm of reciprocity states the expectation that people 
will respond favorably to each other by returning benefits for 
benefits 
Theory of the Norm of 
Reciprocity 
The theoretical foundation that the norm of reciprocity is a 
universal, conditional norm based on the understanding that 
people will respond favorably to each other by returning 
benefits for benefits and that people will not harm those from 
which they have received benefits. 
Renowned Being known by many people in a particular area of 
research 
Grants Endowments of research funding covering  any funding for 
scientific researcher in which the researchers do not have to 
repay 
Grant Funding Institutes Government organizations that provide scientific 
researchers with endowments to conduct research 
Collaboration Collaborative associations between two or more research 
scientists and/or research institutions 
Requester A scientific researcher who asks for data from another 
scientific researcher 
Grantee A recipient of data 
Granter A contributor of data 
Carrot A reward 




CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Carrot and the Stick: Rules and Expectations for Data Sharing 
Practices 
 
Science has become big science. Experiments now involve intricate apparatus 
that cost billions of dollars.  Private industry and government agencies fund these 
scientific endeavors.  Funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are the advocates of big science.  With the 
backing of the U.S. government and tax payer dollars, these funding agencies have 
continued to promote science and scientific discovery.  Along the way, there have been 
some rule changes.  As technology advanced and science became more collaborative, 
funding agencies realized the need to implement data sharing practices (NSF, 2001; 
NIH 2003).   
On April 1, 2001, The National Science Foundation (NSF) issued a press release 
announcing that the future of data sharing was going to change: 
NSF …expects investigators to share with other researchers, at no more than 
incremental cost and within a reasonable time, the data, samples, physical 
collections and other supporting materials created or gathered in the course of 
the work. It also encourages awardees to share software and inventions or 
otherwise act to make the innovations they embody widely useful and usable. 
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b. Adjustments and, where essential, exceptions may be allowed to safeguard 
the rights of individuals and subjects, the validity of results, or the integrity of 
collections or to accommodate legitimate interests of investigators (pg. 17). 
 The National Institute for Health (NIH) followed the lead of NSF and also 
implemented data sharing regulations for all of its grant recipients (NIH, 2003).  
Then, in February of 2013, a memo was sent from the Executive Office of the 
President , Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) with the objective 
that “federally funded scientific research are made available to and useful for the 
public, industry, and the scientific community,” (Holdren, 2013). With two of the 
largest grand funding institutes supporting data sharing practices, scientists 
began to understand that their data sets were now community property.  
Although the idea of data sharing seems productive in the advancement of 
science, some researchers remain skeptical about sharing their data sets (Ceci, 
1988 and Tenopir et al., 2011).  After synthesis and analysis of the data sharing 
research, several themes of why scientists do not want to share their data sets 
have emerged.  Campbell et al found that researchers were concerned about 
several aspects of data sharing including:  it requires too much effort; the grantor 
is protecting his/her rights or the research team’s rights to the information for 
further publication (2002); and if the research is innovative and applied value, 
then there is monetary significance to the findings contained in the data sets and 
the initial researchers should have ownership rights (Bjaalie, 2007). 
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 Douglass et al, in a similar study, found that government scientists do not 
share their data for several reasons, including insufficient time, lack of funding, 
lack of standards, lack of platform, and not having rights to make the data public 
(2014). Walters found with regard to faculty in academe, the reasons for not 
sharing data stem from not yet being published, no clear policy on 
acknowledgement, reciprocity, or collaboration, and data misuse (2014). Both 
studies look at populations that receive funding from institutes that require data 
management plans, yet sharing the data collected from these funded research 
projects are not publically available in most circumstances (Douglass et al, 2014; 
Walters, 2014). Walter’s focus on NSF/NIH requirements and Douglass et al’s 
focus on government scientists are all funded by public money and therefore 
data sharing is mandated, but to what extent? Data management may be a 
requirement to receive funding, but once the money has been distributed, what 
happens to the data?  What happens if the researchers decided not to share their 
data? Although these agencies have demanded that data management become 
a part of every grant application, there is still a lack of policy for the mandate, 
especially with regard to rewards or penalties.  There have been strides in the 
last decade to mandate data sharing, but in order to achieve the level of 
collaboration and transparency that should occur in scientific endeavors, stricter 
policies, practices, and penalties need to be implemented (Douglass et al, 2014). 
The reason data sharing practices are changing in science is because of 
the common belief that science ought be transparent (Birnholtz &Bietz, 2003), 
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(Bjaalie, 2007), (Ceci, 1998), (Kaye et al, 2009), (Koslow, 2002), (Kraut et al, 
1998), (Postle et al, 2002), Rashid et al, 2006), (Schofield et al, 2009), (Van 
Haouse et al, 1998), (Zimmerman, 2003, 2008).  While most researchers believe 
that transparency is one of the key aspects of science and scientific discovery, 
scientists do not believe transparency is a problem in data sharing because 
results are available and published in the literature (Ceci, 1998).   
By publishing results, other researchers are able to access the information 
on any findings in any subject domain.  However, if data requests are being 
denied and data sets are not available, then the transparency of science is rightly 
being questioned.  When scientists grant requests and share their data sets, one 
of the main reasons these scientists give for complying with such requests is for 
transparency of science (Ceci, 1998).   
 Another reason given for sharing primary data sets is for the promotion of 
scientific discovery (Birnholtz & Bietz, 2003), (Bjaalie, 2007), (Ceci, 1998), (Kaye 
et al, 2009), (Koslow, 2002), (Kraut et al, 1988), (Postle et al, 2002), (Rashid et 
al, 2006), (Schofield et al, 2009), (Van House et al, 1998), (Zimmerman, 2003, 
2008).  “Sharing data should make research more efficient and greatly facilitate 
our understanding,” (Koslow, 2002).  When researchers in any domain, publish 
their findings in academic journals, they do not include their primary data.  They 
present a particular phenomenon that they are interested in researching, a 
review of what is known about the phenomenon, and how they plan on looking at 
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the phenomenon, a methods section, analysis, and discussion.  What are not 
present are other non-significant results or questions that were explored in the 
research.  Upon publication, other researchers from the same domain read the 
journals and often times formulate their own ideas on how they would have 
approached the phenomenon.  When these researchers find fatal flaws, they are 
more likely to try replicating the project to see what answers they receive.  One of 
the first steps in replication would be asking for the primary data of the project 
initially carried out.  One of the rules of scientific discovery is replication.    It is 
through further study that discoveries are made.  “Primary data will gain in value 
if it is put into the public domain once it has been analyzed and published.  The 
combination of this new data with other data, and further analysis and correlation 
with other data, will lead to increased value, and new knowledge and 
understanding,” (Koslow, 2002). The idea of increased knowledge value has led 
many institutions to create repositories for disseminating data and scholarly work.  
Sharing data also allows other researchers to not only see how data was 
collected, but to also see what was explored and what was dismissed.  By 
sharing primary data sets, other researchers in a domain can scrutinize the 
analysis of the data, note any incongruity, and reassess the data for maximum 
impact (Birnholtz & Bietz, 2003).  By reevaluating data sets, new questions can 
arise and therefore new answers can develop. 
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Research today produces large amounts of data. After analysis and 
publication, the project is usually considered complete.  When reviewing 
scholarly communication in journals, the data presented are never sufficient for 
reuse; therefore to ensure the ability of reexamination, data sharing has to 
become standard practice (Goodman et al, 2014).  Their paper published in 
PLoS Computational Biology, give 10 rules to ensure good data sharing 
practices.  Those rules are as follows: 
1. Publish your data and encourage others to publish their data. 
2. Share your data online but use a Permanent Identifier. 
3. Conduct Science with Reuse in Mind 
4. Publish Workflow as Context 
5. Link your data to your publication 
6. Publish your code  
7. Establish how you want credit 
8. Foster and use Data Repositories 
9. Reward Colleagues who share their data properly 
10.  Be a Booster for Data Science. (Goodman et al, 2014). 
In a 1999, fMRI Data Center was developed as an open-access data 
sharing platform in the neuroimaging community (Van Horn and Gazzaniga, 
2002), where all data was available to “interpret, analyze, and replicate the 
deposited studies” (Mennes et al, 2013). In order to make the repository a 
success, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, required 
all contributors to the journal to deposit their data in the fMRIDC (Mennes et al, 
2013). This mandate was followed by controversy.  There were two major 
concerns. The first was that of technology/platform, as some of the data 
generated could be larger than 30 GB; how would storage and distribution work? 
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The second concern was that of losing a competitive edge in the research, 
especially with regards to promotion (tenure) and grant money (Mennes et al 
2013). Vines et al also raise another concern and that is how can the researchers 
be assured that data will be available in a repository in the future (2013)> In a 
follow up study of the fMRIDC, it was determined that the initial mandate, which 
was controversial at the time, was exactly what made the fMRIDC a success. 
“Voluntary sharing of data may be the ideal, but many researchers find 
themselves very busy and, given the choice of how to spend their time, may not 
find the benefits to the community to be compelling enough to make the effort. 
Additionally, only having data from a “coalition of the willing” may not fully capture 
the breadth and depth of imaging experimental methods being applied across the 
field. On the other hand, sharing required as a condition of funding or journal 
publication can ensure a steady stream of data” (Van Horn & Gazzaniga, 2013). 
There are several factors that determine whether or not an adoption of 
data sharing standards will succeed. Van Horn & Gazzaniga, in their longitudinal 
study, found that working closely with funding agencies and journal editors was a 
crucial element. Five other key aspects of data sharing include: good curation, 
multiple data sharing models, delivery of information in any form necessary, 
community engagement, and plan for the end of funding (2013). It was the 
implementation of the mandate 15 years ago that resulted in a successful model 
of data sharing. Since the implementation, the field of cognitive neuroimaging as 
seen advancements in several areas including: analytic methods, data mining, 
modeling, and visualization techniques (Van Horn & Ishai, 2007), thus promoting 




Repositories: Institutional and Subject  
 
“A repository may be defined as a set of systems and services which facilitates 
the ingest, storage, management, retrieval, display, and reuse of digital objects. 
Repositories may be set up by institutions, subject communities, research 
funders, or other groups. They may prove access to a variety of digital objects, 
including peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, theses, datasets, 
learning objects, or rich medical files.” (Pinfield, 2009, 165). 
 
  
Institutional Repositories are generally institutionally specific.  For 
example, IRs established in a university created so that faculty, staff, and 
students within an academic organization can share their work within their 
specific intellectual community instead of publishing to the “public webwide” open 
access repositories (Green and Gutmann, 2007). According to Pinfield et al, 
2014, most repositories, on a global scale, are institutional repositories 
containing multidisciplinary, English-language documents and frequently exploit 
open-source software. The goal of institutional repositories is to collect as much 
research information as possible. In 2012, there were 2253 global repositories, 
where 1864 were institutional repositories, accounting for 83% of the total 
(Pinfield et al, 2014).There is also logarithmic evidence that the growth of 
institutional repositories is on the rise (Pinfield et al, 2014), with academic 
organizations prescribing to the adage, “if you build it, they will come.” However, 
the success of an institutional repository is still dependent upon the faculty, staff, 
and students and their “willingness to contribute” to the repository (Green & 
Gutmann, 2007) (Lynch 2003).  Foster and Gibbons completed a qualitative 
study on institutional repositories and found that these repositories are not 
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convincing enough for owners of the content to contribute. Authors and 
researchers want an institutional repository that would also benefit their needs, 
as well as provide a service to the interested public.  The list of requirements 
compiled from the participants in the study include: easily accessible searches, 
preservation, linking capabilities, maintaining ownership of their work, no server 
maintenance, and no complications (Foster & Gibbons 2005). Therefore, just 
providing a platform for an institutional repository is not enough for information 
owners to supply their work. Because institutional repositories mature by means 
of voluntary deposits, capture rates will remain in short supply unless “institutions 
and funding agencies” create a mandate for sharing (Harnard, 2006). 
A subject repository or domain-specific repository is the oldest form of 
information repositories (Xia, 2008). When information became digitized, a need 
arose to share the information with colleagues within the same research field 
(Green & Gutmann, 2006). Domain-specific repositories “hold collections of 
materials grouped by type, subject, or purpose and intrinsically support domain- 
or discipline-oriented research needs” (Green & Gutmann, 2006). The subject 
repository allows researchers to “reuse, repurpose, analyze, and recompile in 
teaching, learning, and research environments” (Green & Gutmann, 2006), which 
in turn, promotes the scientific method. In contrast to institutional repositories, 
where the goal is about quantity; the mission of subject repositories is to protect 
and preserve data in the long term.  This preservation encourages more scientific 
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sharing, as the donators feel as though there work is being archived and 
protected (Bjork, 2013), and are therefore more likely self-archive their work.  
Kling and McKim conducted an empirical study examining social 
knowledge sharing practices specific to discipline and found that there are 
differences in sharing between scientists of different domains (2000). The study 
also acknowledges that digital publication and preservation are (at the time) in an 
early period and in the future, there will be a shift from subject repositories to 
institutional repositories. According to a study conducted by Xia in 2008, 
physicists are the leaders of self-archiving in subject repositories.  Xia goes on to 
infer, based on the theory of disciplinary culture, that physicist will be more likely 
to contribute to institutional repositories because of their past contributions to 
domain-specific repositories. However, findings of the research found a negative 
correlation between established self-archiving in subject repositories and the 
likelihood of self-archiving in intuitional repositories (Xia 200), meaning if 
physicists have already archived their work in a subject repository, they are less 
likely to re-deposit their work in an institutional repository. 
Perhaps the time has changed, as there is a need and an effort for digital 
repositories, both institutional and subject specific to develop a partnerships with 
researchers in order to create a strategy that would benefit both contributors and 
users (Green & Gutmann, 2006). According to Pinfield: 
“The complex relationships between individual researchers, their 
organizations and subject communities, and their funders and 
governments, and the contributions all these actors make to repository 
development, need to be further explored in order to explain ongoing 
developments. Open-access approaches in general, and OA repositories 
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in particular, have the potential to transform scholarly practice. The period 
since 2005 has seen considerable change in this area, with a repository 
infrastructure being established which is capable of playing an important 
role in scholarly communication. However, it is the next decade which is 
likely to reveal the extent to which these changes make a widespread and 
enduring impact on the scholarly community” (2014). 
 
Data Sharing Practices and Behavioral Expectations   
Although there is a growing amount of literature concerning data sharing 
and data sharing practices, finding empirical research on the phenomenon is 
more difficult (Zimmerman, 2003).   When researching data sharing and 
behavioral norms that may influence the practice of data sharing, the information 
available is more obscure.  With regard to behavioral norms, in general and the 
norm of reciprocity, in particular, is especially important to examine in the context 
of data sharing because the norm is a powerful engine for motivating, creating, 
sustaining, and regulating the cooperative behavior required for self-sustaining 
social organizations (Axelrod, 2006) and is therefore the theoretical foundation of 
this study.  Although reciprocity has been implicit in some studies involving data 
sharing (Tenopir et al, 2011, Zimmerman 2003, 2008), no measurement scales 
of reciprocity in regard to sharing data have been designed.  With technological 
advances, increased construction of large, domain specific data repositories, 
scientific transparency, and requirement by grant funding institutions to share 
data,  data sharing, or the lack thereof, is a phenomenon that is not going to 
simply go away.   The theory of the norm of reciprocity and the power it carries 
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as a universal, behavioral norm (Gouldner, 1960), could help explain why some 
scientists participate in data sharing practices while others do not. 
The Theory of the Norm of Reciprocity 
 
There are essentially two rules involved in the norm of reciprocity, first 
help those who have helped you and secondly, do not harm those who have 
helped you (Gouldner, 1960).  Although the theory of the norm of reciprocity is 
thought to be universal, it is not considered unconditional.  As Gouldner points 
out, “reciprocity connotes that each party has rights and duties,” indicating that 
the norm is only valid if both parties prescribe to the same helping behavior 
(1960, p.169).  If for some reason a helping behavior is not reciprocated, then the 
natural self-perpetuating norm will cease to exist between the two parties.  
However, if helping behavior is reciprocated, it is never on an equivocal scale of 
the initial helped received and it is for that reason that the norm of reciprocity is 
self-perpetuating in “stable social systems” (Gouldner, 1960).   
 
Compliance Benefits and Detriments   
  
Interestingly, for the scientists receiving a request for data, the costs of 
complying with this request may outweigh the benefits they potentially receive 
(Miller & Prentice, 1996). At the minimum, there are costs associated with the 
effort of locating and sending the data (or allowing the requester access if 
sending is not an option). Additionally, the sender will probably check the data’s 
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formatting and content to ensure no confidential information is shared, and make 
changes where necessary. Others who worked on the study may also be 
consulted before the data can be shared (Ceci, 1988).  To the contrary, the 
benefits for the sender are limited: at best the receiver finds out that the sender 
drew the correct conclusions based on the available data (Campbell et al, 2002). 
Such findings tend not to be published, thus there is no potential for improved 
reputation. At worst, the receiver may identify flaws in the sender’s published 
conclusions and expose those flaws, which may damage the sender’s reputation 
and face (a potential cost) (Panagopoulos, 2010). 
Sharing data thus appears a seemingly irrational act, of which personal 
costs outweigh potential benefits. Research has shown other examples of 
humans’ acts that come with costs but few tangible benefits. For example, 
Panagopoulos found that voting is an act for which where social norms can 
override the disparity between individual costs and benefits (2010).  Aronson, an 
evolutionary psychologist, believes that there are survival mechanisms for 
helping or altruistic behaviors (2007).  By helping others, we are assuming that in 
the future others will help us and by continuing the self-perpetuating norm of 
reciprocity, we will continue to help and be helped.  These helping behaviors 
enable the survival mechanisms to stimulate a survival mechanism (Aronson, 
2007).   For this mechanism to work in a data sharing context, the scientist must 
be aware of the social norm that proscribes data sharing. Three primary sources 
of data are evaluated to construct social norms: observable behaviors, direct and 
 21 
 
indirect communication, and knowledge of the self (Miller & Prentice, 1996).   The 
source of the norm impacts how it will operate, i.e., use of appeals to gain 
compliance, which could be a direct or indirect communicative effort.   
 
Injunctive and Descriptive Norms 
  
 
Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren distinguish between two types of social 
norms: injunctive norms and descriptive norms (1990). Injunctive norms are 
based on what is morally approved or disapproved conduct. They thus refer to 
what ought to be done. Descriptive norms are based on what is typical or normal 
behavior. They thus refer to what most people do, and that behavior is imitated. 
Although what is morally approved is usually what most people do, this is not 
always the case; injunctive and descriptive norms at times may misalign.  
When data sharing is an injunctive norm for scientists it specifies what a 
good scientist ought to do.  When data sharing is an injunctive norm for scientists 
it specifies what other scientists do as a guide for behavior. As this type of norm 
is learned through observable behaviors, the scientists for whom data sharing is 
an injunctive norm have been exposed to acts of data sharing, either by seeing 
their colleagues share data or by benefiting from receiving data upon their own 
request. Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren found that each of the two types will only 
impact behavior when it is salient at the moment (1990). As it is not clear which 
type of norm is more salient in the context of data sharing, this study will appeal 
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to each type to test the overall effect of appealing to social norms and to test 
against each other the effects of appealing to the two types.  
Scientists do their work (conducting research, presenting findings and 
conclusions) within the context of the scientific community.  In addition to the 
rules that society at large sets for behavior, the scientific community has evolved 
its own set of guidelines for appropriate behavior that indicates how scientists are 
expected to conduct their work (Ceci, 1988).  The scientific community is guided 
by one objective:  the quest for knowledge (Zins, 2007).  To move toward this 
objective and achieve valid knowledge, procedures, measures, and conclusions 
of studies are then submitted to field-specific journals, where they are subjected 
to the peer-review process.  The findings are published and then read by other 
experts in the field.  When these scientists read scholarly journals, they become 
aware of what other scientists are working on within their domain.  When 
published findings question or negate previous findings, scientists become 
interested in re-examining the experiment, data, and/or analysis.  Science should 
be transparent.  Part of the scientific process is being able to recreate a study, 
comparing results with similar studies, and gathering data for analysis and 
conclusions.  This arduous process is part of the scientific method.  Conducting 
experiments is time consuming and costly.  In some cases, the entire study may 
not need to be replicated; perhaps the analysis needs to be reviewed.  In these 
studies access to the original data could provide immediate insight to 
questionable or perhaps revolutionary findings.   Within the scientific community, 
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the guideline is that such access ought to be granted.  Thus, scientists are 
expected to share their data when data is requested.  Such a guideline for 
appropriate behavior set in a community is conceptualized as a social norm 
(Cialdini, 2007). 
 
To Share or Not To Share 
 
Traditionally, collaborations happened in single laboratories, where 
scientists and scientists-in-training would share instrumentation and ideas, 
however with the introduction and use of electronic documentation, laboratory 
collaboration has shifted from confided spaces to less physical addresses 
(Birnholtz & Bietz, 2003).  Although the ability to disseminate and house large 
sets of primary data are now a reality, scientists have often been hesitant to 
share their data (Campbell et al, 2002).    According to Birnholtz and Bietz 
(2003), there are three over arching reasons why data sharing is not a universal 
practice:   
1.  scientists are not willing to share 
2. there are problems locating data sets 
3. there are problems when determining how one uses shared data 
As discussed by Birnhotlz and Bietz (2003), Campbell et al (2002), Ceci 
(1988), Chui (2006), and Zimmerman (2003), sometimes scientists are just not 
willing to share their primary data sets.  There are many reasons scientists give 
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for not wanting to disseminate their data, but the fundamental reason that has 
reoccurred in the literature is simply that the scientists do not want to.  There is 
often a feeling of absolute ownership between the scientists and the data sets 
(Zimmerman, 2008), but there are other explanations of why scientists are not 
complying with data requests.   
Hauesser, in her comparison of academic and industry data sharing, 
found that data sharing is dependent upon two variables:  the culture of the 
institution and whether or not the information requested has economic value 
(2009).  Another issue that has been previously stated about why scientists do 
not grant requests of their data sets involves the actual storage and location of 
the datasets (Birnholtz & Bietz, 2003).  Although there have been considerable 
advances in technology, including the ability to store large data sets, there 
remains problems with access and dissemination of information (Stolte et al, 
2003).  As requirements for data management plans emerge, the ease of 
accessing informational data sets will be established and in turn, scientist will be 
discouraged to assert that their data sets are somewhere but they cannot 
remember where or how to access them.  Perhaps with the development and 
acceptance of repositories, both institutional and subject specific, the need to 
remember and or ease of access can be alleviated?  
The final identified concern about not sharing data sets involves use.  
Scientists are hesitant to share their primary data because the requestor of the 
data does not have to disclose the intended use of the data (Postle et al., 2002) 
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(Schofield et al., 2009) (Van House et al, 1998). “Once in the possession of a 
data set, understanding it requires knowledge of the context of its creation,” 
which means if a researcher does not understand all the procedural knowledge, 
the data sets could be of no use (Birnholtz & Bietz, 2003).   Campbell et al also 
address the issue of use and determine that when  scientists runs a particular 
experiment, they have a particular question in mind; experimental design, data 
collection, and analysis all depend on the question being asked (2002).  When 
another scientist wants to run a meta-analysis on a primary data set, the 
questions being asked are typically not the same questions the data set were 
initially collected to answer, i.e., predicating post-hoc hypotheses.   
The questions still remains, why do some scientists regularly share their 
data sets while others never share their data?  How does the norm of reciprocity 
influence the scientists’ sharing behavior?  Is requesting primary data sets like 
bargaining for a first born child? 
Freedman and Frasier found that compliance was more likely to be 
granted from a requestee if a small favor was initiated first (1966).  The foot-in-
the-door technique has greater compliance rates than asking for large favors 
first.  The idea is that a relationship is developed after an initial small favor is 
requested.  If the small favor is agreed upon, then the relationship is open to 
larger favors (Freedman & Frasier, 1966).  However, Cialdini et al found that the 
inverse is also true (1975).  If a person first asks a very large favor, perhaps for 
participation in a large-scale research project, but the large favor is followed by a 
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less demanding favor, like access to a primary data set, then the requestee is 
more likely to comply with the smaller favor (Cialdini et al, 1975).  Cialdini et al 
also measured controlled compliance by asking only for a small favor, however 
compliance was fifty-percent higher when a large favor was followed by a small 
favor (1975).  If scientists believe that they have ownership rights to their primary 
data sets, then asking for their data on an initial contact may result in less 
compliance.  As the data shows, it would be wiser to either ask for a small initial 
favor, i.e., contact information on someone who does similar research, and then 
follow that first request with the larger request of data sets or ask for a larger 
favor, i.e., participation in a large-scale, time consuming study, and immediately 
ask for a smaller favor, the primary data set. 
 
Status, Power, Face 
 
Marwell & Schmitt found that there are sixteen types of compliance 
gaining techniques and within those techniques, some variables that affect 
compliance (1967).  One of the major moderators on compliance is face or power 
of the requestor, i.e., status.  Face or power is described as how much influence 
one has on a particular domain (Iamnitchi et al, 2002; Tenopir et al, 2011).  The 
theory of social power states that power is developed over time and that social 
influence is dependent upon communicative interactions (French, 1956).  In order 
for a scientist to be considered renowned, there must be consensus by other 
scientists in that area of discipline (Lippitt et al, 1952).  If a renowned scientist 
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requests a data set from a colleague, he is more likely to receive his request 
simply based on his reputation as a renowned scientist (Deutsch, 1955).  A 
requestor with high power, having a respectable scientific reputation, is thought 
to be more thoughtful, critical, engaging, serious, forthcoming, scientific, and 
connected (Bourne & Barbour, 2011).  According to Lippitt et al, “members with 
high attributed power receive more deference behavior from other members and 
initiate more social influence than do low power members” (1952, pg. 59).  
Conversely, Regan found that a person of high social power, perhaps renowned 
in his domain, is less likely to comply with data requests (1971) (Mui et al, 2002), 
indicating that those who are more renown in their research field may be less 
inclined to share data. 
 
Data Sharing and the Norm of Reciprocity Connection 
 
Now that the major grant funding institutes have regulated data sharing 
practices and data management plans, scientists will be obliged to share and 
disseminate their primary data sets.  What is most interesting about the norm of 
reciprocity is that the behavior is dictated by society.   In science society, data 
sharing practices are becoming common procedure and within that system, the 
norm of reciprocity will also become customary.  Although some scientists are 
opposed to sharing, with the grant funding agencies requiring allocation of all 
data, how will the norm of reciprocity be adapted to by the scientific community?  
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With science opening up to new levels of transparency only made possible by 
technological innovation, science could be on the brink of a revolution? 
 Research Questions for Analysis 
 
RQ1:   Are scientists who have a greater endorsement of the norm of reciprocity 
more likely to share data than scientists who have a lesser endorsement of the 
norm?   
RQ2:   Are scientists that receive research support from a grant-funding source, 
more likely to share data than those who do not receive support?   
RQ3:  Does the number of publications of scientists affect sharing behavior? 
RQ4:  Data are more likely to be shared if the requester is renowned in the field 








Measures and Method 
 
 This section describes the methods used to conduct the study, and 
presents and explains the research questions. The methods discussion includes 
descriptions of the population randomly sampled for participation in the study, the 
operationalization of the research questions, the way in which the study was 
disseminated, and the techniques employed for data analysis.   
Definition of the Population 
 
 
In order to test the theory of the norm of reciprocity in the context of data 
sharing, data were collected from research scientists conducting research in the 
hard sciences at 25 Research Intensive Universities across the United States.  
Theses Research Intensive Universities (RIUs) were listed in the Carnegie 
Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (2014). The foundation classifies 
108 universities as RUIs with very high research activity. The potential RIUs were 
then narrowed by institution type and private universities, which numbered 35, 
were discarded. The remaining 73 public RUIs were added to a random numbers 
generator (Babbie, 1990) where each RUI had the same chance of being 
selected as the others. After determining which 25 RUIs were selected, the 
researcher consulted the faculty directory of several departments at the 25 RUIs. 
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The departments were in the hard sciences: physics, chemistry, microbiology, 
astronomy, and in psychology.  The researcher created a spread sheet with the 
email addresses of all researchers at the 25 RUIs conducting research in the 
scholarly areas listed above.  Based on a salary study conducted in 2012, there 
are approximately 1.5 million faculty and teaching members at American 
universities, of that population, approximately 500,000 are faculty members of 
RUIs.  The population can then be narrowed by discipline and of the 500,000 
faculty members at RUIs, 100,000 are faculty researchers in science (Lederman, 
2012). Thus making the sampling factor , whereas n=1400 and N=1400,  
= 1.4 % of the total population was contacted to participate in the study. 
The cross-sectional survey was distributed to 1400 possible participants 
by random numbers table (Babbie, 1990) on 21 January 2014, after receiving 
IRB approval.    Potential participants were identified via universities’ faculty 
directory and an explanatory email (see Appendix D) was sent to the individual 
research scientists and faculty members, along with a unique survey link (see 
Appendices A, B, and C). This plan resulted in a sample consisting of n=84 
faculty members from 25 RUIs. Recipients were neither compensated nor 
penalized for participating. 
Operationalization of the Research Questions 
 
 
This section enumerates the concepts surrounding the research 
questions, and the variables that convey them, connecting the concepts to the 
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indicator items from the measurement instrument. There are two major concepts 
of the study. The first is endorsement of the norm of reciprocity. The second is 
scientific data sharing. There are also three minor themes of the research. The 
first is time spent as a researcher. The second is number of publications over the 
researchers’ careers. The third is whether or not the researchers’ work is grant 
funded.  All of these concepts areas are measured directly by one or more 
questions on the survey instrument.  
 
Research question 1 states: Are scientists who have a greater 
endorsement of the norm of reciprocity more likely to share data than scientists 
who have a lesser endorsement of the norm? This question is principally a 
summary of the overarching theme of this research. The norm of reciprocity is a 
social norm, or a set of rules that a group or society deems appropriate or 
inappropriate in terms of values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Marshall & 
Johns, 2009). In order to measure the participants’ endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity, Eisenberger’s Adjusted Scale was employed. Eisenberger’s Adjusted 
Scale is a  20 item, 7 point, Likert-type scale,  with potential responses ranging 
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly disagree (7) was used to indicated how 
much respondents agree or disagree with the ideas expressed by each item 
statement. All of the statement used to measure the independent variable 
express attitudes associated with the norm of reciprocity. 
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Research question 2 asks: Are scientists that receive support from grant-
funding sources, more likely to share data than those who do not receive 
support? The research question was addressed by asking an open-ended single 
item question asking if the participant was receiving grant funding.  That answer 
was correlated with the scores on the index calculated from the indicators on 
Eisenberger’s Adjusted Scale, which measured the participants’ endorsement of 
the norm of reciprocity. 
Research question 3 asks: Does the number of publications of research 
scientists affect sharing behavior? This research question is closely tied to 
research question 2, where experience was measured by years in the field; 
however this dependent variable is measured by 1 open-ended question asking 
participants to estimate how many publications they have produced since 
entering their research area. This measure was then calculated for correlation 
with the participants’ scores on the index of Eisenberger’s Adjusted Scale. 
Research question 4 states: Is data more likely to be shared by a 
renowned researcher? This question was posed in the Data Sharing Scale, item 
number 9, which asks, “Pat should share data with researchers who are 
renowned in Pat’s area of research.” According to previous research conducted 
by Tenopir et al, 2011, scientists that are more renowned or experienced are 
more likely to share data than those researchers who are less renowned.  It was 
inferred in that particular study that being renowned in a research area comes 
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toward the end of a career, when competition for publications, promotions, etc, 
are less advantageous (Tenopir et al., 2011). 
This question addresses the potential variable of “experience” on data 
sharing. In order to determine how experienced a researcher was, one two open-
ended questions were asked. The first question was number of years 
researching in your field. The other question posed was number of publications.  
It is understood that the number of years in a particular research area and the 
number of publications would have a positive relationship meaning, the longer a 
researcher has been conducting research, the more publications that researcher 
would produce. Therefore it is understood that with publications over time, there 
would be growth. The numbers of publications are also an indicator of how 
renowned a researcher is in a particular research area.  After data collection, it 
was determined that the participants’ responses to number of years in the field 
were an accurate measurement of experience and therefore no analysis of 
variance test executed.  The response from number of years in the field was 





Participation was solicited by an invitational email where participants were 
asked to complete a questionnaire (See Appendix D). The invitation email also 
contained a unique link to the survey, using Survey Monkey©.  One week later, a 
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reminder was sent to those who had not yet participated in the survey.  This was 




In addition to a measure containing several demographic items (Appendix 
C), such as age, race, research area, and years as a faculty member, number of 
publications, the questionnaire was composed of two separate measures:  the 
Adjusted Eisenberger Scale (AES) Data Sharing Scale (DSS).  The AES was 
administered to rate the participants endorsement of the  norm of reciprocity and 
the DSS which was developed to measure data sharing attitudes, was created by 
the researcher for this study.  The original Eisenberger scale which was 
developed in 2004 consists of 24 items with response scales ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  In past research, the measure has 
been found to be reliable with reliabilities ranging from α=.81 to 
α=.91(Eisenberger et al, 2004; Boster et al, 2005).   Van Horn et al, showed that 
the global assessment of reciprocity is valid in terms of convergent and construct 
validity (2001), but suggest using self-rated scales that measure reciprocity with 
a single item because the scales “are conceptually closest to the phenomenon to 
be explained and they measure the balance of exchange” (Väänänen et al, 2005, 
pg. 179).  The AEG consists of 20 Likert-type items with the scale continuum 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (see Appendix A).  The 
second measure, the DSS, consists of 24 Likert-type items developed to 
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measure attitudes and beliefs about data sharing practices (see Appendix B).  
Figure 2, shows how the developed measures correlate with the hypotheses and 
research questions. The data collection involved creating a Web-based survey 


































Table 2: Variables, Research Questions & Items on the Survey 
 
Variable Name Research Question Items on the Survey 
Independent Variable 1: 
Norm of Reciprocity 
Descriptive Research 
Question 1: Are 
scientists who have a 
greater endorsement of 
the Norm of Reciprocity 
more likely to share 
than scientists who 
have a lesser 
endorsement of the 
Norm of Reciprocity? 
See Questions 1-20; 
Eisenberger’s Adjusted 
Scale 
Dependent Variable 1: 
Data Sharing 
Descriptive Research 
Question 2: Why do 
some scientists share 
data while others do 
not? 
See questions 1-24, 
Data Sharing Scale. 
Control Variable 1: Area 
of Research 
Descriptive Research 
Question 3: Does the 
area of research affect 
data sharing? 
See Question 2, 
Demographics, 
Appendix C 
Control Variable 2: 
Experience as a 
researcher (time) 
Descriptive Research 
Question 4 Does 
experience of the 
researcher, defined as 
the amount of time and 
research a scientists 
has conducted, affect 
data sharing? 
See Question 3, 
Demographics, 
Appendix C 
Control Variable 3: 




Question 5: Do the 
number of publications 
of scientists affect 
sharing behavior? 
See Question 5, 
Demographics, 
Appendix C; 




Question 6: Do funding 
agencies proved 
incentives and /or 
penalties for data 
management plans/data 
sharing practices? 
See Question 4, 
Demographics, 
Appendix C; See 
Questions 1, 2, 4, 20-24 




































Variable Name Research Question Items on the Survey 
Control Variable 5: Are you 




Question 7: If the norm of 
reciprocity is universal, what 
will sharing practices look like 
in underrepresented groups? 
See Question 6, 




CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS  
 





The sample consisted of n=84, or a 6% response rate.  A response rate of 
6%, although not ideal, is considered to be valid because the sample was 
randomly drawn. The sample is large enough to allow for decent, preliminary 
analysis.  The sample consisted of research faculty, participating in quantitative 
research at RUIs in the academic fields of physics, biology, chemistry, and 










 Figure 2. Participants by Research Area 
 
Research faculty at RUIs are continuously conducting research and some 
of that research is time sensitive, therefore social science research participation 
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is not viewed as being crucial. The initial survey was distributed on 21 January 
2014, which was also at the beginning of the spring semester for most faculty 
members, so an optional survey was not a focal point. There was no reward or 
punishment for participating, and with no incentive to contribute, most chose not 




The participants consisted of 29 % female and 71% male, which is 
representative of the sample of faculty members in hard sciences at RUIs. 
Participants ages ranged from 29 to 81 years old (M=50.68, SD=12.24). The 
participants reported number of years working in academe as M=18.92, 
SD=12.99, with a range from 6 months to 47 years. Participants also reported 
number of publications during their tenure as M=80.18, SD=91.22, with a range 




After determining reliabilities for each of the two scales, it was apparent 
that participants experienced end of survey fatigue, as the measures at the end 
of the instruments were causing the reliabilities of the measures to plummet.  
Three items were dropped from the NOR measure resulting in a 9 item scale with 
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a reliability of α=.81.  Twelve items were dropped from the DSS measure 
resulting in an 8 item scale with a reliability of α=.92. 
 
 
Table 3: Norm of Reciprocity Reliability Scale 
 
  Mean     SD       Min-Max        Skew       Kurtosis       Cronbach’s α 
 







Table 4: Data Sharing and Demographics Index Scale 
 
   Mean      SD       Min-Max        Skew       Kurtosis       Cronbach’s α 
 
Data Sharing   5.34      1.0       2.92 -7.0          -.15              -.38         .92 
 
Age    50.68     12.24     29-81             .22               -.57 
 
Time in Acad   18.92     12.99     .5 – 47            .46              -.79 
 






For research question 1, which states: scientists who have a greater 
endorsement of the norm of reciprocity are more likely to share data than 
scientists who have a lesser endorsement of the norm, a NOR and DSS index 
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was compiled and a simple correlation was calculated, r=0.02, (p=NS). There 
was no significant correlation found between degree of endorsement of 














(1)           (2)          (3)          (4)         (5)         (6) 
 
Data Sharing  (1)       --              
 
NOR    (2)       .07         -- 
 
# of Pubs   (3)       .11         .29*          -- 
 
Grant Funded  (4)      -.24        .02           .20*        -- 
 
Time in Acad.  (5)       .09         -.33*        .62*        .06          -- 
 




Research question 2 states: scientists that receive research support 
through a grant-funding source are more likely to share data than scientists that 
do not receive support? Bivariate correlation was calculated for the NOR index 
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and grant funding. No relationship was found between data sharing and/or 
endorsement of the norm of reciprocity, number of publications, age, or time as 
an academic researcher.  Multiple regression analysis was used to test if grant 
funding predicted participants’ sharing behavior. The results of the regression 
indicated the two variables had a negative impact upon each other, R=0.32, F (5, 
68) =1.59, NS, where grant funding had a negative correlation with data sharing, 
R2= -0.29, p<0.05. This indicates that scientists who receive grant funding are 
less likely to share data than scientist that do not receive grant-funded support.  
Research question 3 states: Do the number of publications affect sharing 
behavior. Because of the results of research question 2, there is no significant 
relationship between number of publications and data sharing, therefore no other 
analysis was conducted. 
 Research question 4 states: Data are more likely to be shared if the 
requester is renowned in the field than if the requestor is not renowned.  Being 
renowned is determined by number of publications and the number of years 
working in the academic area.  No significant correlation was found between data 
sharing and being renowned as a researcher. 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
 
After examining the results, it was recommended to explore more analysis 
in regard to the norm of reciprocity scale with demographic information provided 
by the participants.   
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One particular item of interest was whether or not discipline affected the 
endorsement of the norm of reciprocity.  In order to analyze the data, reported 
discipline was re-coded into four areas, disregarding specialized fields of physics, 
biology, chemistry, and psychology.  For instance, if a participant reported the 
area of discipline as ‘particle physics,’ that response was re-coded as ‘physics’.   
Regression analysis was performed for each dependent variable to predict 
the overall endorsement of the norm of reciprocity. The full model is not 
statistically significant [F= 5.43, (5, 52) = .57, p=0.69]. There was not a significant 
effect of discipline on the endorsement of the norm of reciprocity at the p<.05 
level for the four groups, [F (3, 77) = .49, p=0.69]. Discipline area is not a 
predictor of the norm of reciprocity. Physicists (M=3.72, SD=1.01), Chemists 
(M=4.05, SD=1.29), Biologists (M=4.00, SD=0.60) or Psychologists (M= 3.85, 
SD=0.95) in this sample, have no effect on the endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity.  
Although the full model was not significant, previously it was found that the 
correlation between number of years since receiving a doctoral degree and 
endorsement of the norm of reciprocity had a relative and positive, meaning that 
individuals who were more recent Ph.D.s had a higher endorsement of the norm 
of reciprocity. Experience was reported by two different variables in this study.  
The first variable was time since receiving a doctorate degree; the second 
variable to measure experience was number of publications.  In order to explore 
whether experience effects one’s endorsement of the norm of reciprocity, a one-
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way between subjects ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of 
time since receiving a doctorate degree on the endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity at the p<.05 level, [F (4, 76) =3.72, p=.008]. Post hoc comparisons 
using Tukey HSD test indicated that mean score for the researchers having 
received a doctorate within the last 5 years (M=4.23, SD=1.22) was significantly 
different than the researchers who received a doctorate degree 25 years ago or 
longer, (M=3.39, SD=0.68). These results suggest that in this sample, time since 
receiving a doctorate degree has an effect on the endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity.  Specifically, the results suggest that the newer researchers have a 
higher endorsement of the norm of reciprocity than older researchers.  
Another way experience was measured in this study was by the number of 
publications the participants reported.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to compare the effect of number of publications on the endorsement 
of the norm of reciprocity. There was no significant effect of the number of 
publications on the endorsement of the norm of reciprocity at the p<.05 level, [F 
(5, 67) = 1.43, p = 0.23). Taken together, these results suggest that number of 
publications has no effect on the endorsement of the norm of reciprocity.  
These post hoc analyses help to determine what variables in the sample 
could affect endorsement of the norm of reciprocity and after conducting the 
analyses, it appears that number of years since receiving a doctorate degree is 
the only variable of significance.  
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Because experience of researcher, measured by time since receiving a 
doctorate degree, had a significant effect on the endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity, it was determined that post hoc analysis on data sharing amongst the 
same variables: number of publications, age of researcher, and number of years 
since receiving a doctorate degree should be examined. 
Taken together, these results suggest that in this sample there is no 
relationship between discipline and number of publications or time since 
doctorate degree and data sharing practices, as the full regression model fit was 
not significant.   
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CHAPTER V  




This study is a preliminary report on testing the theory of the Norm of 
Reciprocity on scientific data sharing. The data in this study have shown that the 
theory of NOR has no correlation with data sharing practices. It also suggests 
that endorsement of the norm of reciprocity is not dependent upon area of 
research (discipline), number of publications, nor time since receiving a doctorate 
degree.  
 After conducting this study, a myriad of questions emerge. Gouldner’s 
theory of the norm of reciprocity claims that the norm is universal and imperative 
for survival (1960). If that is the case, then why is data that is funded by external 
organizations that require data management plans not available to the public? 
Why are scientists that receive external monies and put in place a data 
management plan, as required in the application procedure, not sharing? If 
reciprocity is not a variable that needs to be considered in data sharing, then 
what are the other variables impeding data sharing?  
Goudner’s theory of the norm of reciprocity claims that the social norm is 
universal. He postulates that throughout history, humans have relied on 
reciprocity to develop alliances and strong group ties (1960). As seen in this 
study, researchers in academe do not have a strong endorsement of the norm. 
After reading copious amounts of literature in social and evolutionary psychology, 
as well as in communication studies, an idea about not sharing arises.  If 
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reciprocity is a favor for a favor, perhaps data sharing is not seen as a favor. 
Perhaps because grant funding is not seen as a favor, the scientists receive 
grants may not feel compelled to share their data.  Another idea of limitation 
arises when thinking about first-hand gifts.  Although Gouldner does not 
emphatically declare that his theory only works in first-hand instances of tit-for-
tat, it is assumed that person-to-person gifts or favors are implied. If that is the 
case and the theory of the norm of reciprocity is limited to first-hand exchanges. 
This variable of direct contact is one possible explanation for the lack of sharing 
behavior seen with the sample population.  
Although this study has shown no relationship between the endorsement 
of the norm of reciprocity and data sharing, what this study has shown is that 
there is a negative correlation between grant funded research and data sharing. 
What does that mean?  Simply stated, if a researcher is receiving external 
funding, he is less likely to share his data. If researchers who are not externally 
funded are more likely to share data than those who are, how can external 
funding agencies encourage and, in fact, demand that researchers give public 
access to that data? Perhaps external funding is not seen as a favor, but is an 
expectation, with that in mind, why would recipients share their data? 
What is interesting about this finding is its potential implications in 
scientific pursuits.  With apparatus, materials and space becoming more 
expansive and expensive, and scientific cooperation obligatory, the lack of 
willingness for scientists to share data will have negative impacts on all scientific 
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efforts. The research lifecycle, as presented by the Joint Information Systems 











JISC has one central principle and that is that “publicly funded research data 
should be openly available to the maximum extent possible” (2010).  This current 
research study suggests that exactly the opposite is happening. Why? 
 49 
 
A study by Arzberger et al suggests that there are several reasons data is 
withheld, accessibility to a hosting platform is the number one reason (2004).  A 
publically accessible platform for all research and datasets seems in the distant 
future, however in the meantime, open access journals, like PLoS has 
implemented specific data sharing guidelines (Tenopir et al, 2011). In a 2009 
study conducted by Savage and Vickers, 10 PLoS published authors were asked 
share their datasets.  Out of the ten researchers contacted, only one researcher 
sent an original dataset.  
Another reason cited for not sharing data are concerns about future 
research and publication using an existing dataset (Savage and Vickers 2009). 
The level of competition for public monies is extraordinary and the ability to 
receive a grant based on past and present research is necessary. Data 
withholding could be due to the competitive nature of funded research, in which 
case, the way grants are applied for, allocated, and then distributed, must be 
reviewed. Birnholtz & Beitz found that data goes unshared because researchers 
are proprietary over their data (2003). Ideas are generated by human beings, and 
although the government funds a majority of scientific research, the researchers 
are producing ideas.  Data is the manifestation of those ideas, after design and 
testing has occurred.  The government may have the right to request the data 
sets from their funded researchers, but what happens to the innovation, the idea? 
When data is shared, does the research idea as well as the implementation of 
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the idea, the method, the apparatus, the results, as well as the analysis, become 
public domain information? 
Perhaps one way to ensure data sharing for researchers using external 
monies is to provide a platform to dump the data.  If a platform is developed for 
externally funded research, which is accessible to all people, there would still 
have to be consequences for withholding data or researchers would not take the 
time and effort to upload their datasets. Seemingly, data sharing with regard to 
government funding could benefit from implementation of penalties for 
withholding, the stick approach.   
While conducting this study, a memorandum was disseminated from the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).  This memorandum will change 
the data sharing practices of every researcher receiving government monies. The 
memorandum alters data sharing policies initiated by NSF in 2001. It states: 
 
“The Administration is committed to ensuring that, to the greatest extent 
and with the fewest constraints possible and consistent with law and the 
objectives set out below, the direct results of federally funded scientific 
research are made available to and useful for the public, industry, and the 





With this new policy in place, all federal funding agencies have to have 
guidelines and procedures for open access data repositories and dissemination.  
 
Limitations and Further Research 
 
This study is small stepping stone to discovering and refining data sharing 
practices.  There are many limitations to this research.  Firstly, the sample size is 
very small.  It can be justified by the represented sample, of academia faculty. 
Some populations are harder to reach than others and for that reason a random 
sample was employed.  Although the resulting participants represent a very small 
section of the entire population of interest, the study is valid. Because of the 
small sample size, it was irrelevant to test data sharing practices amongst groups 
of researchers in differing fields.  The hypothesis that, for example, physicists 
share more data than chemists, would add general knowledge to the social 
science world.  When the discovery of why some researchers share their data 
while others do not emerges, stakeholders can use that information to persuade 
the non-sharers to share.  
Another limitation to the study is the actual measurement instruments. The 
Eisenberger’s Adjusted Scale was adjusted to read in the third person. The initial 
thought of the researcher was participants will be more truthful if they do not take 
the measures personally.  In hindsight, the researcher is unsure if that was 
beneficial.  A pilot study of that scale would have beneficial however given the 
special population, it would have been difficult to test on a representative sample. 
The Data Sharing scale, too, could have benefitted from a pilot study to test the 
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measures and perhaps could have been disseminated to a group of available 
participants, i.e., graduate students, to test validity and reliable of the scale.  A 
pilot study using a small population of graduate students, presumably, future 
academic researchers, would have given some insight into the depth and breadth 
of data sharing.  It could also raise new questions about data sharing, such as: 
Are there generational differences in behavior with regard to data sharing?  Are 
there generational differences in endorsement of the norm of reciprocity?  Are 
less senior researchers more comfortable with the idea of open access 
repositories for data?   
This study is not comprehensive and much more research needs to be 
done.  Research on data sharing should be conducted and policies for public 
monies should be reviewed and revised. It is only then the promotion of science 
and scientific discovery can really be public. With new policy being enacted, as of 
2013, the act of data sharing by researchers funded by government monies 
should no longer be part of the discourse.  If these institutes provide clear 
guidelines on where, how, when, and what to do with research data and uphold 
penalties and rewards, then all federally funded research will become open 
access. Open access data will enable further innovation, curation, preservation, 
and analysis.  A longitudinal study could determine if the policy change in data 





Journals and Data Policy 
 Beginning in 2003, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) enacted data 
sharing plans for all large, grant funded research (NIH, 2003).  Although a data 
sharing policy was put forth, there have been problems with implementation on 
the part of the researchers and scientists (Warr, 2014). Since the time of 
inception, many other data sharing initiatives have been set forth.  The creation 
of the Public Library of Science (PLoS) in 2003, has also familiarized researchers 
with data sharing practices. As an open-access, peer-reviewed journal, PLoS 
journals have always required all submissions to make the data available to 
readers (PLoS, 2014). However, both NIH and PLos have had to release new, 
extended data policies because of lack of participation by researchers or lack of 
clear direction from NIH and PLoS as to how to share the data (Bloom, 2013). 
Several issues arise as barriers to data sharing: technological platform, 
dissemination, accessibility, and storage.  However, as technology grows and 
solves the problems of where, how, and how much data to archive, an over 
arching obstacle emerges. That obstacle is a cultural issue. There are different 
cultures based on discipline or scientific area, as the data lifecycle in disciplines 
vary (Warr, 2014). There is also a problem among scientists concerning 
ownership, as scientists’ strongly believe that the data they have collected 
belongs to them (Piwowar &Chapman 2010).  Another concern expressed by 
researchers is that they spend time making their data available, yet there is no 
way to be certain that they will receive any kind of credit for sharing (Warr, 2014). 
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These cultural issues are currently the largest impedance on sharing data. With 
these concerns and lack of practice of data sharing policy that PLoS, NIH, and 
NSF are continuously updating their data sharing policies.  For example, PLoS 
has clarified the requirement of “data available upon request,” by providing a 
platform and eliminating the gatekeeper (Bloom et al, 2014).  According to PLoS: 
 
“As of March 1, 2014, authors submitting their research manuscript to PLoS 
journals will find a field in the online submission form where they will be asked to 
provide the data availability information, which will then be available to editors 
and reviewers during the review process and, in the event of publication, will be 
published with the article.” (Bloom et al, 2014). 
 
 Now that some journals and government agencies are clarifying their data 
policies, there should be less grey area as to where, how, and when researchers 
should share their data. Journals like PLoS are also blazing the trail for other 
publications to implement similar data sharing policies (Sturges et al, 2014). 
However, in a 2014 research study on journal data sharing policies, the 
researchers found that more than half of the journals studied had no data sharing 
policy (Sturges et al, 2014), suggesting that not only does the culture of 
researchers need to adapt, but also the culture of publications. A group of 
researchers at Nottingham University, UK, created a project called JoRD. It was 
established to “conduct a feasibility study into the scope and shape of a 
 55 
 
sustainable service that will collate and summarise journal data policies,” 
(Sturges et al, 2014). The project ran from July to December 2012 and aimed to: 
“Identify and consult with a wide range of stakeholders, publishers and others, 
and to develop a detailed set of stakeholder requirements and service 
specifications (with regard to journal data research).” 
 This project was an attempt to establish a business framework to provide 
clear guidance and information related to journal’s data sharing policies.  It was 
discovered that a lack of consistency of policy existed, not just amongst different 
journals, but within the same journal (Sturges et al, 2014).  If the scientific journal 
is going to remain the centerpiece of the communication process of science, 
journals are going to have to experience a cultural shift, as well (McCain, 1995).  
Journals are going to have to define exactly what their data sharing policies are 
in order to get researchers to comply.   
  
New Researchers vs. Established Researchers 
 
 After conducting the post hoc analyses, it was suggested that newer 
researchers have a higher endorsement of the norm of reciprocity than their 
more established counterparts.  This finding has particular interest because of 
the new standards and procedures for sharing data (Holdren, 2013). Perhaps the 
newer researchers are expressing a stronger endorsement of the norm of 
reciprocity because they are use to collaborating on research, coming directly out 
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of academia?   The new researchers are from an era where sharing data is a 
social norm; therefore tit-for-tat would be status quo.  However, further post hoc 
analysis shows that although newer Ph.D.’s report a greater endorsement of the 
norm of reciprocity, there was no indication in this study’s sample that the same 
group legitimized stronger data sharing practices.  What are the expectations of 
both new and established researchers in regard to data sharing and or the norm 
of reciprocity? 
 Another limitation of the research is the dropping of several questions from 
both measures. It was evident when calculating the reliabilities of the measures 
that the end items on each scale were problematic.  After a few of the items were 
dropped, the reliabilities of both measures increased. When items are dropped 
from a measure, some questions will go unanswered. One particular research 
question of interest that will go unanswered in this study concerns the theory of 
the norm of reciprocity and states: “If the norm of reciprocity is universal, what 
will the sharing practices look like in underrepresented groups?” The research 
question is an important one.  Although Gouldner theorized universality of the 
norm, he did so over 50 years ago.  Perhaps our values and acceptance of 
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Adjusted Eisenberger Scale of Norm of Reciprocity Scale 
                      1         2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree                                             Strongly Agree   
              
1.  If someone important to Pat does something negative     1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 to Pat, Pat should do something even more negative  
to  them.   
 
2. If someone treats Pat badly, Pat should treat them           1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
even worse. 
 
3. If someone treats Pat badly, Pat should treat that            1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
person badly in return. 
 
4. Pat should not give help to those who treat others           1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
badly. 
 
5. If someone dislikes Pat, Pat should dislike them.             1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
6. If someone wants to be Pat’s enemy, Pat should      1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
treat them like an enemy. 
 
7. If someone says something nasty to Pat, Pat should        1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
say something nasty back. 
 
8. If someone distrusts Pat, Pat should distrust them.           1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
9. When someone treats Pat badly, Pat should still act         1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 nicely to them. 
 
10. Pat should feel uncomfortable when someone does         1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
him a favor that he knows he won’t be able to  
return. 
 
11. If someone does something for Pat, Pat should feel       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
required to do something for them. 
 
12. If someone gives Pat a gift, Pat should feel obligated       1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
to get them a gift. 
 





14.  Pat should always repay someone who has done            1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Pat a favor. 
 
15. If Sam sends Pat a birthday card, Pat should                    1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
send Sam a birthday card. 
 
16. If someone does Pat a favor, Pat should        1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
repay them in some way. 
 
17. If someone says something pleasant to Pat,        1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Pat should say something pleasant back. 
 
18. If someone treats Pat well, Pat should treat        1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
that person well in return. 
 
19. Pat should not forget if Pat owes someone                       1  2  3  4  5  6  7                                         
a favor.   
 
20.  If someone is nasty to Pat, Pat should                             1 2  3  4  5  6  7                                       






Data Sharing Scale 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly Disagree                                                                Strongly Agree  
                  
          
1.  If Pat is required by a grant funding institute to           1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 share data, then Pat should share data. 
 
2. If funding for Pat’s research is contingent on Pat         1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
sharing data, then Pat should share data. 
 
3. Pat should share data in order to promote the             1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 scientific  method. 
 
4. Pat should not share data unless Pat is rewarded.      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
  
5. Pat should not share data with researchers                 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
unless Pat has a relationship with those 
 researchers. 
 
6. Pat should share data with colleagues that Pat           1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
has collaborated with in the past. 
 
7. Pat should share data with any researcher that           1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
requests Pat’s data.   
 
8. Pat should not share data with anyone requesting      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Pat’s data. 
 
9. Pat should share data with researchers who are        1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
renown in Pat’s area of research. 
 
10. Pat should share data with researchers that have      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
positive reputations. 
 
11. Pat should not share data with researchers whose     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
reputations are uncertain to Pat. 
 
12. Pat should share data with researchers who have      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
shared data with Pat.   
 
13. When Chris shares data with  Pat, Pat should             1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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share data with Chris. 
 
14. When Chris shares data with Pat, Pat should              1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
share data with Jamie.   
 
15. If Jamie does not share data with Pat, Pat should       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
not share data with Jamie.   
 
16. If Jamie does not share data with Pat, Pat should       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
not share data with Jamie or Chris.   
 
17. If Pat gives Chris data, Chris should give            1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Pat data. 
 
18. If Pat gives Chris data, Pat should also give          1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Jamie data. 
 
19. If Pat gives data to Jamie, Pat should get credit       1   2    3   4   5   6   7 
for sharing data. 
 
20. If  Jamie uses Pat’s data, Pat should be                   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
acknowledged  in Jamie’s research. 
 
21.  If Jamie gives Pat’s data to Chris, Chris                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 should  acknowledge Jamie and Pat. 
 
22. If Jamie gives Pat’s data to Chris, Chris                   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
      should  acknowledge Jamie. 
 
23. If Jamie gives Pat’s data to Chris, Chris should       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
acknowledge Pat. 
 
24. If Chris uses Pat’s data, Chris does not need        1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
















1. What is your age? ___________ 
 
2. What is your area of research? _______________ 
 
 
3. How long have you been conducting research at a university as a faculty 
member?  *(A faculty member is defined as a university employee that conducts 
research, instructs courses, or both).   ___________________ 
 
4.  Are you currently receiving funding from an organization that calls for a data 
management plan for the data collected?    _________________ 
 
 
5.  How many publications have you contributed to since you began conducting 
research at a university as a faculty member? (A faculty member is defined as a 
university employee that conducts research, instructs courses, or both)  

























November 10, 2013 
You are invited to participate in an academic research survey especially for scientific 
researchers.  If you are not an active researcher in academe, please feel free to discard 
this email.   
I am a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee.  This survey is for my 
dissertation research on testing the theory of the norm of reciprocity on scientific data 
sharing.  By participating in the survey, you will be contributing valuable insights about 
your attitudes and behavior as a researcher, which will significantly enhance my 
understanding of your most important work.  The ultimate goal of this research is to gain 
insight into why scientific data sharing is more of an exception than a rule.   
Completing the questionnaire is simple and will only take about 15 minutes of your time.  
You will receive an email on November 17, 2014 with the survey link.   
Your responses will be kept strictly confidential.  They will be combined with responses 
from many other people, solely for the purpose of descriptive statistical analysis.   
Additional information about the study is available on the Informed Consent statement, 
which will is at the bottom of this email and will accompany the survey link.  Please 
complete your survey upon receipt.  If you have any questions, please contact me at the 
email address or phone number listed below.  I appreciate your time, effort, and 




Crystal Pleake Sherline 
University of Tennessee Knoxville 
College of Communication and Information 
School of Information Science 
451 Communication Bldg. 
1345 Circle Park Circle 
Knoxville, TN  37996-0341 
Csherli1@utk.edu 

















INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Project Name:  “Testing the Theory of the Norm of Reciprocity on Scientific Data 
Sharing:  The Carrot or the Stick Approach?” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
You are invited to participate in a research study about scientific data sharing.  The 
study seeks to gain some understanding of data sharing practices in the academic 
researcher community.  The findings from this research could help improve data 
management protocol, data repositories, and data sharing practices.   
 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS’ INVOLEMENT IN THE STUDY 
Your participation in the study involves completing the attached survey questionnaire 
and submitting it electronically.   
Please complete the survey only once.  It is estimated that the survey will take no more 
than 15 minutes to complete. 
 
RISKS 
Because participation is limited to completing a survey, there are no foreseeable risks to 
the participants from their involvement in the study.   
 
BENEFITS 
It is anticipated that this research will benefit the participants by extending the body of 
knowledge about data sharing practices in the participants’ discipline.   
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The information in the study records will be kept confidential.  Data will be stored 
securely and will be made available only to the researcher conducting the study and 
members of her doctoral committee, unless participants specifically give permission in 
writing to do otherwise.  Data from the survey will only be reported in aggregate terms; 
no reference will be made in oral or written reports that could link participants to the 




You will not be financially compensated for participating in this study. 
 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The University of Tennessee does not “automatically” reimburse participants for medical 
claims or other compensation.  The risk of participating in this study is minimal, so no 
need for emergency medical treatment is anticipated.  If physical injury is suffered 
during the course of research, or for more information, please notify the investigator:  
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Crystal Pleake Sherline, College of Communication and Information, at 
csherli1@utk.edu or (865)773.4234. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATON 
If you have questions at any time about the study or procedures, you may contact the 
researcher, Crystal Pleake Sherline, at The University of Tennessee, College of 
Communication and Information, 451 Communication Bldg., 1345 Circle Park Drive, 
Knoxville, TN  37996 and/or (865)773.4234 or email at:  csherli1@utk.edu.  If you have 
questions about your rights as a participant, contact the Office of Research Compliance 
Officer at (865)974.3446.   
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without 
penalty.  If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  If you 
withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be returned to 
































Crystal Pleake Sherline was born in Port Charlotte, Florida, to the parents of Roger and 
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River Elementary School, Lee Middle School, and Fort Myers High School. After 
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education, she moved to Europe, traveled, had two children, and returned to the US. 
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